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INTRODUCTION
On April 28, 1988, an Aloha Airlines Boeing 737 experienced an In-flight
structural failure when the upper fuselage ripped open and a large section of
the skin peeled away. This failure was precipitated by the llnk up of small
fatigue cracks extending from adjacent rivet holes in the fuselage lap splice
Joint. This incident of failure brought about by multiple-site damage (MSD)
helped focus the attention of the industry to the problems of operating an
aging commercial transport fleet. Currently, approximately 46 percent of the
Jet airplanes in the fleet are over 15 years old with 26 percent being over 20
years old. During the past 2 years the industry has acted to insure the
continued safe operation of the aging fleet. These activities include
increased emphasis on maintenance, inspection, and repair as well as mandatory
modifications to various models in the fleet. Additional ways of insuring
safety are being vigorously pursued. One such possibility is conducting a
pressure proof test of the fuselage. While the proof test has the potential
to be destructive, it has great appeal because it also has the potential to
function as an unambiguous "pass_fail" indicator of safety. The purpose of
this document is to establish the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration/Federal Aviation Administration (NASA/FAA) position on
conducting pressure proof tests of the fuselage of aging commercial transport
Jet airplanes.
The procedure of overpressurizing the fuselage has been postulated as a
technique (proof test) that will insure the continued safe operation of
airplanes with fatigue cracks in the fuselage skin. Therefore, the proof test
is an alternative to nondestructive inspection (NDI) methods for detecting the
presence of cracks before they reach a critical length that would produce a
structural failure. Within this context, it must be assumed that cracks will
exist in the fuselage after the proof test. Since the proof test pressure is
higher than the normal in-flight cabin pressure, the test assures that the
existing fatigue cracks which survive the test will be smaller than the
critical crack length that would produce an in-flight failure, thereby
insuring the continued safe operation of the airplane. However, the proof
test will not guarantee an indefinite life for the fuselage because the
existing cracks will continue to grow during normal service. Furthermore,
existing cracks will extend more during the proof test than during a typical
flight| thus, the residual strength of the fuselage will be lowered by the
test. This reduction in the residual strength must not compromise the
fail-safe or damage tolerance capabilities of the fuselage. Therefore, a
technical evaluation is required to determine (I) the proof test pressure load
for which a benefit in life is achieved and (2) the interval of flights for
which the test must be repeated to assure continued flight safety.
A precedent for conducting the proof test at a pressure above the normal in-
flight pressure (P) exists because many new airplanes are subjected to the
design limit pressure of 1.33P. The purpose of this test is to demonstrate
that the fuselage can survive the design limit pressure without structural
failure. However, after this demonstration the fuselage is only required to
be fail-safe or damage tolerant at I.IOP. At no other time in the life of the
airplane would the fuselage be subjected to the design limit pressure unless a
major structural repair or alteration required a new certification.
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The military has successfully employed the concept of proof testing the F-Ill
to insure against in-flight failures brought about by fatigue cracking in
steel components. The proof test subjected the wings and fuselage to body-
bending loads produced by hydraulic actuators. However, the F-Ill proof test
program is not directly relevant to the issue of pressure-proof testing the
fuselage of commercial transport airplanes , This is because of the
fundamentally different fatigue crack growth characteristics of the steel
components and the aluminum fuselage components. In another instance, the
wings of the B-52D fleet were also successfully proof tested. This was a
one-time test to assure continued operational safety until the wings were
re-sklnned. The test was performed to limit load, and the fleet had to be
placed under payload and maneuver restrictions until the repairs were
completed. Finally, there are provisions for proof testing in the established
standards for gas cylinders (49 CFR 173), pipelines (49 CFR 192), and railroad
tank cars (49 CFR 179). However, these standards are based on hydraulic
testing; a method that is impractical for aircraft fuselages.
The FAA and NASA have recently completed independent technical evaluations of
the concept of pressure proof testing the fuselage of commercial transport
airplanes. The results of these evaluations are summarized herein. (The
complete technical details may be found in references 1 and 2.) The
objectives of the evaluations were to establish the potential benefit of the
pressure proof tests, to quantify the most desirable proof test pressure, and
to quantify the required proof test interval. The focus of the evaluations
was on multiple-site cracks extending from adjacent rivet holes of a typical
fuselage longitudinal lap splice Joint. The conclusions are based solely on
the technical results of the subject evaluations as summarized in this
document.
EXPERIMENTAL AND ANALYTICAL INVESTIGATION
NASA conducted a combined experimental and analytical investigation.
Experimental tests were conducted on panels with a long, central through-crack
to simulate multiple-site damage after linkup. Tests were also conducted on
panels with evenly spaced unloaded holes and panels with a lap splice joint
attached by a single row of rivets to simulate multlple-site damage before
linkup. The FAA evaluation involved a damage tolerance analysis of the Boeing
737 lap splice Joint. The effects of stress, proof pressure load, material
data, rivet hole size, and rivet spacing were assessed. While a range of
proof factors were evaluated, both investigations focused on proof factors of
1.33 and i.50. (The proof factor is defined as the ratio of the proof test
pressure load divided by the normal In-flight pressure load.)
RESULTS
The results from the two independent evaluations are summarized in table 1
showing the required proof test interval for proof factors of 1.33 and 1.50.
For consistency with the standard practice for establishing nondestructive
inspection intervals, a factor-of-safety of 2.0 has been applied to the proof
test intervals to achieve the results in table i. This factor is intended to
compensate for the uncertainties involved in making crack growth life
predictions.
%TABLE I.
Evaluation
REQUIRED PROOF TEST INTERVAL TO SCREEN CRITICAL
MULTIPLE-SITE CRACKING IN RIVETED SPLICE JOINTS
PROOF FACTOR
1.33 1.50
(# of Flights) (# of Flights)
NASA 275 765
FAA 200 600
One additional experimental evaluation was conducted by Arthur D. Little,
Inc., under the FAA research program. This test simulated the 1.33 proof
factor and produced the same inspection interval as the corresponding NASA
test.
General qualitative results obtained from both investigations are:
I. The remaining life with the proof test is longer than without the proof
test.
2. The remaining life after the proof test increases with increasing proof
factor.
3. The FAA evaluation revealed that safety equal to that of proof testing
could be achieved by eddy current inspection of the rivets in the splice
Joints at an inspection interval of about 1200 flights.
CONCLUSIONS
The FAA and NASA do not support pressure proof testing the fuselage of
aging commercial transport aircraft. The argument against proof testing is as
follows:
i. A single proof test will not insure an indefinite life. Therefore, the
proof test must be repeated at regular intervals.
2. For a proof factor of 1.33, the required proof test interval must be
below 300 flights to account for uncertainties in the evaluation.
3. Conducting the proof test at a proof factor of 1.5 would considerably
exceed the fuselage design limit load and, therefore, is not consistent with
accepted safe practice.
4. Better safety can be assured by implementing enhanced nondestructive
inspection requirements, and adequate reliability can be achieved by an
inspection interval several times longer than the proof test interval.
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